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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMhJN l 
Jurisdiction i i iiniuh J iipiii this f ouit.pursuant to-Utah Code Annotated 
§78- 2a 3(k)Supp.-(1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND S1 AND ARD OF REVIEW • • 
Issue: 'Whether 'the Mai court acted properly in grantin .um ^ Moaon 
for Summary Judgment. 
Stanuaiw ^ >>t-. iv - J ;x>n review of a g:ran„t of a Motion, for Summary 
Judgment, the appellate court appiies the same stanaci**: ~* ;..a* -..•••.. 
Briggs v. Holcomb. * * ** • ^  »[< • >.; Durham v. Ma , 
571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). Accordingij, tne inquiry i_, . . . i ^ ...... ... „ .y 
genuine issue as to any material,, fact, and if there wa s not, whcuiei the dete^rian: was 
entitle* uciii as a matter of law. Thornock v. Cook. 604 V ?d 934. -oo ,u^ : , . 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, uiuinances, ruie 
:ruIatior/> where the intern , . •* M, C in this maiicx. ,. 
«•,> j - u i e s 0 f c i v i i procedure is implicas , _ ties agree on that ruie's 
interpretation, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The present action, arises out of tht Ji I'm-Iiitwii «l a piulessiunal relationship 
between two physic. • *? *f- uiant agreed to share office and certain oil 
expenses. Plaintiff and defendant nevei iii,;" i a partnership. They each, retained the In i 
of their own labor while agreeing to shaic expenses I ii >i benefit and to help 
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"cover" for each other as professional colleagues. 
The dissolution of this association has not been unlike the dissolution of a 
marital relationship. In the present action, the plaintiff Dr. MacArthur has made allegations 
that defendant Dr. Jacobs conspired with the office staff so that certain "desirable" patient-
types would be directed towards Dr. Jacobs. Dr. Jacobs has denied the allegations. Every 
member of the office staff was deposed and also denied the allegations. 
In support of his claims, the plaintiff never identified a single instance of 
misdirection or a single patient who was misdirected to Dr. Jacobs as alleged. In fact, the 
plaintiff Dr. MacArthur made considerably more income in every year of their relationship 
than did Dr. Jacobs. The deposition of the plaintiff was taken and the plaintiff was asked: 
Question: Do you believe that is evidence of some conspiracy? Or do you 
think that that is something that happens when two people associate together 
and split their days in the office? 
Answer: In the mosaic of what we are looking at, it appears to be possibly 
another piece of the puzzle, or the tip of something more extensive. I don't 
know. That's what I am wanting to find out. 
(R. 153) (emphasis added). Also at his deposition, plaintiff was asked: "No one has ever 
told you a conspiracy existed that would have been a member of that conspiracy?" Plaintiff 
responded: "Not yet." (R. 57). Following exhaustive discovery, neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendant could find any indication from any employee or patient that defendant Dr. Jacobs 
had engaged in any wrongdoing. Instead, what appeared as the basis of this lawsuit was a 
report conducted by Elaine Gephart, a business consultant who works with Intermountain 
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Health Care (hereinafter the Gephart report).1 
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the 29th day of June, 1993. (R. 
70). The district court received plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition more than 60 days 
later on September 7, 1993. (R. 186). In a ruling dated December 3, 1993, summary 
judgment as to all causes of action in plaintiffs Complaint was granted. A final order 
granting summary judgment was entered on the 15th day of December, 1993. (R. 207). 
Plaintiff moved the court to reconsider its ruling, or in the alternative to make 
specific findings and conclusions of law. (R. 210). Notice of Appeal was filed January 14, 
1994. (R. 211). The court denied plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider or in the Alternative to 
Make Specific Findings and Conclusions of Law on the 22nd of February, 1994. (R. 387). 
In conjunction with its Motion for Summary Judgment below, defendant set 
forth the following undisputed statements of fact which were either admitted or deemed 
admitted by the plaintiff as follows (R. 146-151): 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are both medical doctors specializing in 
orthopaedics. 
2. In approximately 1976 plaintiff and defendant formed a business 
association known as the Provo Orthopaedic Clinic. 
3. Plaintiff described his relationship with the defendant as follows: MI am 
sure he had few complaints about me, and I about him. But, it was pretty much a fairly 
strong relationship. Positive, friends, associates, co-workers.M 
*In plaintiffs Brief, plaintiff states: MIt was the data gathered and the conclusions derived 
[from the Gephart report] that set in motion the plaintiffs five causes of action." See 
plaintiffs Brief at 5. 
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4. Plaintiff consistently had higher revenues and profits than defendant. 
5. Plaintiff saw many more older patients who specifically requested him. 
6. Defendant did not accept any patients covered by Medicaid unless they 
were referred from another physician; plaintiff did accept Medicaid patients without a 
referral. 
7. Plaintiff and defendant maintained a business arrangement that did not 
include sharing professional fees, but included sharing office expenses, including expenses of 
location, staff, supplies, and equipment. 
8. In plaintiffs Complaint, plaintiff asserted that he commissioned a 
comprehensive and analytical report (the Gephart report) examining the operation of the 
Provo Orthopaedic Clinic between 1985 and 1990, utilizing patient admission data of both 
plaintiff and defendant, and conducting an analytical review that included age groups, the 
primary insurance coverage, patient-type, diagnostic related groups (DRG), Medicare 
patients, historical review, and a comparative six-year historical review of both plaintiff and 
defendant's practices. 
9. While the Gephart Report was being compiled, plaintiff entered into a 
personal relationship with Debra Laub. Ms. Laub was an employee working on the Gephart 
report. During their relationship, plaintiff and Ms. Laub would discuss the Gephart report. 
10. Plaintiffs romantic relationship with Debra Laub, a member of the 
team which compiled the Gephart report, was intimate to the extent the plaintiff and Ms. 
Laub discussed marriage. 
11. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that certain staff members deliberately 
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fabricated patient questionnaires in order to conceal certain facts. 
12. Plaintiff in his Complaint has alleged that the comprehensive analytical 
report commissioned by him contained the conclusion that plaintiff maintained the greatest 
proportion of the patient admissions from 1985 to 1990, and that defendant experienced 
significant overall growth in his practice during the same time. 
13. Discovery in the matter showed that the plaintiff had employed a 
handwriting expert whose report was attached to defendant's principle memorandum. 
14. Plaintiffs handwriting expert claimed to be able to ascertain the 
motives of individuals and third-parties from writing. The handwriting expert's report states: 
MSome person of influence in the Provo Orthopaedic Clinic's patient survey has requested the 
staff to fill out the forms for reasons of their own, . . ." 
15. Plaintiff has stated that he depended on the opinion of experts for his 
conclusions, specifically plaintiff depended upon the Gephart Report. 
16. Plaintiff has alleged that members of the office staff were engaged in a 
conspiracy to divert certain types of desirable patients away from plaintiff and towards 
defendant. Plaintiff maintained that he reached this conclusion as a result of the Gephart 
report. 
17. Plaintiff admitted that he had no other independent knowledge to 
support any of his conclusions or accusations in this case. In his deposition, plaintiff 
acknowledged that he had nothing besides the Gephart Report to support his conclusions and 
that he has no other factual support that any conspiracy existed. 
18. Plaintiff stated that he had no reason to believe that Dr. Jacobs's 
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actions were for any other purpose than to benefit himself economically. 
19. Plaintiff stated that he did not believe defendant acted out of any ill will 
towards him. 
20. During the period of time relevant to this case, the plaintiff was going 
through a divorce. This divorce included allegations or beliefs of the plaintiff that his then 
wife was having an affair with plaintiffs sister's husband* 
21. The plaintiffs staff testified that plaintiffs divorce interfered with his 
practice. During plaintiffs divorce he would cancel more appointments and go home more 
often than usual. 
22. Plaintiff admits that during the period of time at issue at least four suits 
alleging malpractice were filed against him. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
All of plaintiffs causes of action are based upon the conclusions of the 
Gephart Report. Other than this report, there is no other suggestion of support of plaintiffs 
allegations of conspiracy in this matter. Plaintiff has admitted that this lawsuit was based 
upon the Gephart Report although the Gephart Report makes no conclusion as to the intent or 
conduct of any party. Plaintiffs reliance on statistical evidence is misplaced as the 
conclusions of the Gephart Report are not a basis upon which proof of misconduct or intent 
can be founded. Plaintiffs report invites speculation by the fact-finder and bears no relation 
to the cause of actions alleged by the plaintiff. 
Additionally, the Gephart Report fails to meet the threshold requirement of 
inherent reliability required of scientific evidence in the State of Utah. Because the Gephart 
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Report did not constitute admissible evidence and because the plaintiff had no other reliable 
evidence which would raise an issue of fact in opposing summary judgment, the trial court 
properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 
Plaintiff alleged five causes of action sounding in economic interference, 
unjust enrichment, constructive fraud, loss of economic opportunity and breach of an implied 
agreement. A review of each and every cause of action pled by the plaintiff exhibits that 
prima facie evidence of the essential elements of each claim was not shown below and that a 
complete lack of evidence or other support lead to the single conclusion that reasonable 
minds could not differ that the plaintiff could not prove his case. As a result, summary 
judgment was proper and should be affirmed on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. NO MATERIAL FACT SUPPORTS PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS. PLAINTIFF'S 
ONLY BASIS FOR SUIT IS A REPORT WHICH IS INADMISSABLE AND 
INCOMPETENT 
All of plaintiffs causes of action incorporate by reference the conclusions of 
the Gephart Report. (Plaintiffs Complaint at 4-8, R. 9). Plaintiff maintains that the Gephart 
Report evidences a conspiracy in the redistribution between plaintiff and defendant in the 
patients treated and in the proceeds received while practicing medicine together. Besides this 
speculative report, there are no other facts which support plaintiffs allegations. Plaintiff has 
admitted that this lawsuit is based upon the Gephart Report although the report makes no 
conclusion as to the intent or conduct of any party. Plaintiffs Brief at 5. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Massey v. Utah Power & Light. 609 P.2d 937, 
938 (Utah 1980) held that naked assertions cannot withstand a motion for summary 
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judgment. The court in Massey noted that adequate time had "been afforded for full 
discovery, yet plaintiff ha[d] not been successful in producing any evidence . . .that 
[defendant's] actions caused [the] injury/ I$L (footnote omitted). This, the court held, 
H[fell] far short of raising a material issue of fact." LI. In the case at hand, nothing more 
than a bare contention has been offered by plaintiff. 
When adequate proof is submitted in support of a motion for summary 
judgment, the pleadings are not sufficient to raise an issue of fact. Dupler v. Yeates. 10 
Utah 2d 251, 351 P.2d 624, 636 (1960). In order for an affidavit, or a report in this case, 
to be effective for use in the determination of a motion for summary judgment, the affidavit 
or report must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence. Norton v. Blackham. 
669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). Likewise, where an affidavit or a report merely reflects 
unsubstantiated conclusions and fails to state evidentiary facts, such a report is insufficient to 
create an issue of fact. Williams v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985). Here, the 
plaintiff has admitted that the Gephart Report forms the basis of this lawsuit, as he stated 
below in his Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment: "In essence however, this 
entire matter rests upon the comprehensive analytical report.M (R. 172). The only way that 
a jury could infer the facts which make up the essential elements of the causes of action 
plead by the plaintiff would be to speculate. Speculation is inappropriate in any 
circumstances and therefore summary judgment was proper. Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co.T 
Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 448 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Plaintiffs reliance on statistical evidence is misplaced as the conclusions of the 
Gephart Report fail to provide a basis upon which proof of misconduct or intent can be 
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founded. In reviewing Utah Rule of Evidence 403, the Utah Supreme Court has outlined 
three categories of evidence which have "an unusually strong propensity to unfairly 
prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury." State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). 
One such category is "statistical evidence of matters not susceptible to 
quantitative analysis." State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989) (citing State v. 
RammeL 721 P.2d 498, 501 (Utah 1986)); State v. Moore. 788 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) (citing RammeD (the other categories are "(1) gruesome photos of a homicide 
scene [and] (2) a rape victim's past sexual activities."). Specifically, the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. RammeL 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986) stated: 
Even where statistically valid probability evidence has been presented . 
. . courts have routinely excluded it when the evidence invites the jury 
to focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical conclusion rather than 
to analyze the evidence before it and decide where the truth lies. 
M. at 501. As mentioned, this prohibition is based on Utah Rule of Evidence 403, which 
allows evidence to be excluded where "its potential for prejudice substantially outweigh[s] its 
probative value." I$L (citing to Utah Rules of Evidence 45 (superseded Sept 1, 1983 
(footnote omitted))). Rammers reasoning has been upheld and applied time and again by 
both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals. See State v. Dibello. 780 
P.2d at 1229 (Utah 1989); State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1256 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Moore. 788 P.2d at 527 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
In the controversy at hand, Plaintiffs analytical report invites speculation and 
bears no relation to the causes of actions alleged by the plaintiff. Additionally, the Gephart 
Report fails to meet the threshold requirement of inherent reliability required in Utah. See 
State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 397 (Utah 1989). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has 
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warned of the "potential of ['scientific'] evidence to distort the fact-finding process by reason 
of its superficial plausibility and its potential for inducing fact finders to accept experts' 
judgments on critical issues rather than making their own," I&. at 399. 
Here, plaintiff failed to show either the reliability or the probative value of the 
Gephart Report. "In the absence of such a showing by the proponent of the evidence and a 
determination by the court as to its threshold reliability, the evidence is inadmissible." IsL at 
403. (citations omitted). The Gephart Report's evidentiary value is therefore non-existent 
and consequently, the report provides no basis upon which to claim a material factual dispute 
precluding summary judgment. 
There are many more probable reasons to explain the actual differences in the 
practices of Dr. Jacobs and Dr. MacArthur. As these doctors have cultivated different 
abilities, the focus in their practices differ. The reputation which each doctor enjoys in the 
community has an impact on the number and specific kinds of patients each doctor receives. 
Every doctor is free to focus his practice on any specialty he wishes. A doctor focusing on 
ailments which are normally found in older patients would most likely experience a larger 
percentage of older patients than one who focuses on sports injuries found in younger 
patients. 
The relationship between Drs. Jacobs and MacArthur is easily comparable to 
that of lawyers in a law practice. Every lawyer cultivates different abilities and can focus 
her practice in different areas of the law. By choosing between areas such as bankruptcy, 
personal injury or business law, a lawyer may be compensated differently than other lawyers 
in the community, or other lawyers within a single office. Depending on the area of 
10 
practice, compensation may be by set fee or contingency. Accordingly, the revenues 
received by each respective attorney would be more xelated to his clientele and the area of 
law in which she practices than any other factor such as client allocation within the firm. 
Likewise, every attorney's reputation in the community has an impact on the number and 
specific kinds of clients that an attorney will represent. 
In the present case, the difference in distribution between the doctors can be 
most significantly explained by the fact that the great majority of individuals presenting 
themselves for treatment specifically requested either Dr. Jacobs' or Dr. MacArthur. Thus, 
any difference in distribution of the patients would arise simply out of the specific requests of 
the patients the doctors served, not out of any collusive or improper actions by any party. 
Other explanations for plaintiffs expectations not being met include Dr. MacArthur's divorce 
during the period at issue, many medical malpractice suits, seeing many more older patients 
than defendant, and accepting Medicaid patients without referral. 
Taunya Lee Gillman, the receptionist at Drs. Jacobs and MacArthur's office, 
stated that ninety to ninety-five percent of the patients specified which doctor they wanted to 
see. (Deposition of Taunya Lee Gillman pg. 11, lines 15-24 (R. 105)). (See also Deposition 
of Jolene Rockwood pg. 13, line 1-2: "I would say, ninety percent of the time, the patients 
would specify which doctor they wanted to see . . ."). The fact that most patients requested 
a specific doctor casts substantial doubt on any claim of conspiracy. What was really at the 
heart of plaintiffs claim was the distribution of five (5) percent of all patients received. 
Significant discovery was conducted in this matter. The discovery failed to 
identify any facts which substantiate plaintiffs claims. The members of Doctors MacArthur 
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and Jacobs' office staff who were deposed categorically denied that there was any collusion 
related to any matter alleged in this litigation. Plaintiff apparently does not appreciate which 
facts are actually on the record. Plaintiff alleged below and again asserts on appeal that the 
defendant himself filled out survey questionnaires in an attempt to provide data that was not 
accurate and that the defendant initially denied falsification of documents until confronted and 
then admitted his complicity. S ^ Plaintiffs Brief at 6. Those allegations and 
representations in plaintiffs brief are not true. The defendant at no time has admitted to 
filling out any of the survey questionnaires, and at no time has admitted any complicity in 
any way. The allegations and insinuations of the plaintiff remain figments of imagination, 
unsupported in the record, but treated as truth beyond dispute. 
The office staff testified as follows. Dana L. Cherington, the office manager, 
stated : "I don't believe that anything was planned. There was nothing, that intentionally, 
that went wrong that was meant to hurt either one of the doctors." (Deposition of Dana L. 
Cherington pg. 71, lines 18-21 (R. 96)). When asked about this lawsuit, Mary Jo Robertson 
stated: "Basically the same thing, yes, that I thought that it was all unfounded. And that's 
what I felt." (Deposition of Mary Jo Robertson pg.53, lines 7-8 (R. 98)). Ms. Robertson 
was asked whether she believed that Dr. MacArthur may have been materially defrauded in 
the area of patient distribution. Ms. Robertson replied, "No, I don't believe that. As far as 
I am concerned, that was not true. I didn't handle all the patients. I put a few in, but I 
never saw any favoritism." (Deposition of Mary Jo Robertson pg. 51, lines 9-11 (R. 99)). 
Jolene Rockwood was asked whether she thought there was any conspiracy in 
the distribution of patients. Ms. Rockwood responded: 
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No, because if [Dr. MacArthur] believes that it happened, then that's fine. He 
has his own opinion, just like I do, and everybody else. I mean, I just didn't 
think that the things that I was told that they found, were by no means 
significant enough, to have them separate or to split up the two doctors. 
Because there things that I could have - yes, we had a lot of old people 
calling in and wanting doctor MacArthur, because they knew his specialty. 
And we would have a lot of knee patients call in and ask for Dr. Jacobs. 
There was nothing going on in the office. I am sorry, but those girls were as 
honest as could be. And, I am sorry, but there wasn't anything going on. I 
know them too well. 
(Deposition of Jolene Rockwood pg. 53, lines 2-14 (R. 109)). Every member of the office 
staff denied the existence of a conspiracy. Defendant denied all allegations of wrong doing. 
Plaintiffs only refutation lies in an inadmissible report that identifies differences in the 
parties' practices, and then improperly speculates as to the reason for those differences. 
Summary judgment was properly entered. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED IN REGARDS TO ALL 
ECONOMIC TORTS ALLEGED 
Plaintiff alleged five causes of action sounding in economic interference, 
unjust enrichment, constructive fraud, loss of economic opportunity and breach of an implied 
agreement. 
The torts of economic interference and loss of economic opportunity are 
recognized in Utah in the single tort of interference of economic relations as outlined by the 
court in Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982). "A claim for 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations is established 'when interference 
resulting in injury to another is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the 
interference itself.'" Mumford v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp.. 858 P.2d 1041, 1043 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993)(quoting TOP Service Body Shoo, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 582 P.2d 
13 
1365, 1371 (Or. 1978)(en banc)). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Leigh Furniture established three requirements 
which plaintiffs must prove to maintain a claim for interference with economic relations: 
[T]he plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered 
with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an 
improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the 
plaintiff. 
Leigh Furniture. 657 P.2d at 304. Accord. St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 
811 P.2d 194, 200 (Utah 1991)(citing Leigh Furniture! 
Plaintiff failed to allege any specific acts which show any interference in 
economic relations, or that any interference was intentional. In a like situation, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the first prong of the Leigh Furniture test had not been satisfied. 
St. Benedict's. 811 P.2d at 201. In St. Benedict's, a development company sued a hospital 
and a construction company. The hospital had leased property near its facility to the 
development company, on which the development company had built and operated two 
professional office buildings serving doctors at the hospital. Subsequently, the hospital also 
leased other property nearby to the construction company to construct and operate a third 
medical office building. The lease between the hospital and the development company 
contained provisions that the operation of the hospital and professional buildings would be 
conducted for the mutual economic advantage and benefit of the parties and that neither party 
would conduct itself so as to cause a diminution of patients of the hospital or tenants of the 
professional building or economic loss to the other. I$L at 196-97. The development 
company claimed that by allowing the construction company to construct a third medical 
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building that the construction company and the hospital had jointly interfered with present 
and prospective economic relations. IsL at 200. 
The Utah Supreme Court in St. Benedict's first looked at the present 
contractual relations and stated: "A party is subject to liability for an intentional inference 
with present contractual relations if he intentionally and improperly causes one of the parties 
not to perform the contract.- IsL at 201. (citing Restatement(2d) of Torts § 766 (1979)). 
The plaintiff in St. Benedict's had no evidence of interference in present contractual 
relationships. In this case, the plaintiff has not alleged any interference with the present 
contractual relation, but only claimed interference of prospective economic relations. No 
allegation has been made that Dr. Jacobs interfered with any patient relationship into which 
Dr. MacArthur had already entered. Outside of the naked assertion of general intentional 
action on the part of defendant, plaintiff has offered nothing. "Without more, no claim for 
interference with the present contractual relations can lie.*1 St. Benedict's. 811 P.2d at 201 
(emphasis in original). 
After looking at existing contractual relations, the court in St. Benedict's 
looked at prospective economic relations. The complaint in St. Benedict's alleged that 
defendants solicited the development company's subleasees for tenancies in the building to be 
built by the construction company, and that as a result, those subleases did not renew their 
existing leases. The court found that M[t]he allegation of solicitation, being an intentional 
interference with prospective contractual relations, satisfied the first element of the Leigh 
Furniture test." I^ L However, the court in St. Benedict's found that neither an improper 
purpose, nor an improper means, had been shown. IcL 
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First, the court found that the construction company had a legitimate interest in 
competing for future business of the development company's tenants. The court found that 
there was no allegation that the defendant's desire to harm the development company 
predominated over other legitimate economic motivations. IJL at 201. In the case at hand, 
plaintiff even stated in his deposition that he did not believe that defendant acted out of any 
ill will towards him. 
As stated above, the Gephart Report commissioned by the plaintiff could not 
have been considered a basis upon which to deny the Motion for Summary Judgement. As a 
result, plaintiff was left with no factual basis whatsoever. Even if the Gephart Report were 
to conclude that some sort of wrongful intention on the part of the defendant existed in this 
matter, such a conclusion would be irrelevant to this Motion for Summary Judgement as it 
would be a legal conclusion. No witness, including the most qualified expert, may assert an 
opinion on the legal conclusion of a case such as whether a party had or did not have an 
intention to do an act. Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Plaintiff failed to plead or assert in opposition to summary judgment that 
economic relations were interfered with for an improper purpose. To prove an improper 
purpose the plaintiff must establish that a tort feasor's "predominant purpose was to injure 
the plaintiff/ St. Benedict's. 811 P.2d at 201 (citing Leigh Furniture). 
An immediate intent to injure a competitor may be motivated and out-
weighed by a legitimate long range interest in furthering one's own 
economic condition. 
Leigh Furniture. 657 P.2d at 307. Plaintiffs Complaint did not even allege that an improper 
purpose predominated defendant's actions in this case. Again, plaintiff himself stated that 
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defendant did not act out of ill will. As a result, plaintiff has failed to plead or make a 
prima facie showing of an improper purpose under Leigh Furniture. 
An alternative to a showing of improper purpose under Leigh Furniture is a 
showing that an improper means was used. Leigh Furniture. 657 P.2d at 304. Improper 
means are actions which are contrary to law, such as violations of statutes, regulations or 
recognized common law. Plaintiff has failed to show that any improper means were 
employed by the defendant. In fact, plaintiff has not alleged, nor has discovery shown, that 
defendant has violated any statute, regulation, or any other law. St. Benedict's. 811 P.2d at 
201. Under similar circumstances, the court in St. Benedict's held: *[H]ere there are no 
facts alleged in the complaint showing any improper means used by the defendantQ. . . ." 
I$L As a result, the development company failed to satisfy the second prong of the Leigh 
Furniture test and Tor this reason, [this] cause of action falls short of stating a claim for 
tortious interference with economic relations and was properly dismissed. . . ." St. 
Benedict's. 811 P.2d at 201. Likewise, in this case the defendant has not alleged improper 
means and has therefore failed to satisfy the second prong of Leigh Furniture. 
In sum, the plaintiff has not shown any intentional acts or omissions of the 
defendant that interfered with economic relations as between himself and the plaintiff, nor 
has the plaintiff shown that an improper means or purpose was used in this case. 
Accordingly, summary judgement was properly granted. 
III. PLAINTIFF DID NOT SHOW FACTS WHICH CONSTITUTE CONSTRUCTIVE 
FRAUD 
A prerequisite to proving constructive fraud is a showing of a confidential 
relationship. Van Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). "A confidential 
17 
relationship arises when one party, having gained the trust and confidence of another, 
exercises extraordinary influence over the other party." I&. (emphasis added). The court in 
Von Hake quoted Bradbury v. Rasmussen. 16 Utah 2d 378, 401 P.2d 710, 713 (1965) as 
follows: 
The doctrine of confidential relationship rests upon the principal of inequality 
between the parties, and implies a position of superiority occupied by one of 
the parties over the other. Mere confidence in one person by another is not 
sufficient alone to constitute such a relationship. The confidence must be 
reposed by one under such circumstances as to created a corresponding duty, 
either legal or moral, upon the part of the other to observe the confidence, and 
it must result in a situation where as a matter of fact there is superior influence 
on one side and dependence on the other. 
& 
The law presumes that one ordinarily makes his or her own judgments, 
however imperfect, and acts on them. It does not readily assume that ones will 
has been overborne by another. Therefore, the law does not lightly recognize 
the existence of a confidential relationship. 
IsL 
While the plaintiff in his complaint pled that a professional relationship existed 
between Drs. MacArthur and Jacobs, the plaintiff has not pied nor made a prima facie 
showing that a confidential relationships exists. 
The plaintiff must, in the absence of a confidential relationship, prove the 
defendant knowingly misrepresented a material fact within intent to induce 
plaintiff to act or refrain from action and that the plaintiff, reasonably relying 
on the misrepresentation, acted (or failed to act) to his detriment. 
Blodgert v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298, 301 (Utah 1978). Plaintiff here has failed to meet this 
burden in every respect. The facts alleged in the complaint and those borne out by discovery 
exhibit that no confidential relationship existed. As the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out, 
constructive fraud requires that the plaintiff show that defendant was in a position of 
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superiority over the plaintiff. No such relationship existed in this case. If anyone had a 
position of superiority, it was held by plaintiff. Likewise, there has been no showing that 
defendant exercised extraordinary influence over the plaintiff. Lastly, plaintiff brought 
forth no evidence which would indicate defendant misrepresented any fact, or that plaintiff 
detrimentally relied on any representation. 
Plaintiff misunderstands the cause of action of constructive fraud. 
Constructive fraud, as stated, requires a showing of a position of superiority between the 
defendant and the plaintiff. Plaintiff in his Brief argues that the defendant was in a position 
of superiority over the staff and with the staffs help some how defrauded the plaintiff. 
Constructive fraud requires that defendant have a position of superiority over plaintiff, not 
the office staff. Thus, the plaintiffs focus is misplaced and shows a misunderstanding of 
the cause of action alleged. Additionally, the plaintiff states: MThe plaintiffs allegation of 
specific acts of fraud are supported by reasonable inferences from [the Gephart Report]/ 
See Plaintiffs Brief at 10. However, the conclusions of the report state nothing concerning 
acts of fraud. 
Plaintiff also claims that a confidential relationship existed between the 
plaintiff and the defendant in that they were in a partnership. £fi£ Plaintiffs Brief at 10. 
There is no evidence of a partnership existing and plaintiff admitted that no partnership 
existed below. (R. 150-151). 
IV, PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT. QUANTUM MERUIT, OR AN IMPLIED CONTRACT 
Plaintiff has claimed that defendant was unjustly enriched and has pled for 
damages in quantum meruit. Plaintiff has also asserted that defendant has breached an 
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implied contract. The law in Utah is that one cannot recover both under unjust enrichment 
and breach of an implied agreement. "Unjust enrichment is a doctrine under which the law 
will imply a promise to pay for goods or services when there is neither an actual nor an 
implied contract between the parties. " Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County. 734 P.2d 
910, 911 (Utah 1987). Since plaintiff has alleged that there was an implied contract in this 
case, plaintiff cannot maintain the cause of action for unjust enrichment. Accordingly, the 
trial court did not err in entering summary judgment for the defendant. 
Additionally, to prevail under the theory of quantum meruit based upon a 
contract implied by acts, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant requested the plaintiff 
to perform services; (2) the plaintiff expected defendant to compensate him; and (3) The 
defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff expected compensation. Knight v. 
Post. 748 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). None of the elements required for 
quantum meruit were pled in plaintiffs Complaint, nor has any discovery in this matter 
exhibited that such facts exist, and accordingly summary judgment was properly granted. 
Plaintiff argues that he would have performed services and would have 
expected compensation had he been given some of the patients that Dr. Jacobs had. While 
this might be true, such an allegation does not support theories of unjust enrichment, 
quantum meruit, or an implied contract. If the plaintiff had performed services he would 
have expected compensation, not from defendant Dr. Jacobs, but from the patients 
themselves. Basically, what the plaintiff is arguing is simply a claim of economic 
interference. Defendant refers the court to Section n of this Brief for a discussion of the tort 
of tortious interference with economic opportunity. 
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Quantum meruit can also be shown through a contract implied in law. In 
order to show a contract implied in law, the plaintiff must show that: (1) The plaintiff 
conferred a benefit upon the defendant; (2) the defendant was aware of the benefit; (3) the 
defendant retained the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for him to 
retain the benefit without payment of its value. Knight v. Post. 748 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). Plaintiff has apparently failed to realize that "the basis of liability in quasi 
contract is the benefit conferred upon defendant and not the detriment incurred by plaintiff." 
First Investment Co. v. Anderson. 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980); See also. Davies v. 
Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)(MThe measure of recovery under quasi 
contract, or contract implied in law is the value or the benefit conferred on the defendant (the 
defendant's gain) and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff"). In the case at hand, 
plaintiff has failed to allege or show that a benefit was conferred upon the defendant by 
plaintiff. Nor has plaintiff alleged or shown, nor have any facts been established through 
discovery, which would indicate that the defendant was aware of any benefits allegedly 
conferred by the plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot maintain that the defendant has 
retained any benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for him to retain the 
benefit without payment of its value. In fact, the relationship between Drs. Jacobs and 
MacArthur was established for services between the doctors and their patients. There was no 
service-related relationship between the two doctors. For this reason, the claims based on 
quantum meruit or other quasi contractual theories are inapplicable to this case, and summary 
judgment was properly granted. 
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CONCLUSION 
As admitted by plaintiff, all of the causes of action in this lawsuit are based on 
the Gephart Report. Discovery in this matter did not illuminate any facts which substantiate 
plaintiffs claims. Statistical data cannot be used as a basis of determining liability, and 
speculation based on those statistics was properly disallowed as evidence in this matter. The 
trial court thereafter had no option but entering summary judgment as to all of the causes of 
action. 
A review of each cause of action alleged shows that the plaintiff failed to make 
a prima facie showing of the essential elements of each claim. Summary judgment was 
proper and the trial court should be affirmed. 
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